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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
In the very early morning of 14 February 2013 Oscar Pistorius fired four hollow tipped ‘black 
talon’ bullets from a high-calibre weapon through a bathroom door in his house, killing his 
girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp. He would later say that he feared an intruder was inside his house, 
and he did not intend to kill Reeva. He was charged with murder and several firearms offences 
arising from unrelated incidents. Pistorius was an athlete, a gold-medal winning Paralympian 
and double-leg amputee. He also participated in non-disabled events including the 2011 World 
Championships and the 2012 Summer Olympics. Steenkamp was a law graduate who had an 
emerging career as a model and television personality. Whilst she was not well-known prior to 
her death, the identity of her killer and the tawdry nature of her death brought her posthumous 
celebrity. The facts of the case motivated an appellate judge to open his judgment with the 
statement: ‘This case involves a human tragedy of Shakespearean proportions’ (Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius [2015] ZASCA 204: [1]). The trial was broadcast 
across multiple media platforms, much of it live, generating intense public scrutiny and 
attention. Following the trial, Pistorius was convicted of the lesser offence of culpable homicide 
and sentenced to five years imprisonment (S v Pistorius [2014] ZAGPPHC 924).1 On appeal, 
the verdict was replaced with a conviction for murder (Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Gauteng v Pistorius [2015] ZASCA 204), and he was sentenced to six years imprisonment (S 
v Pistorius [2016] ZAGPPHC 724). After another appeal, his sentence was increased to 13 
years and five months (Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius [2017] ZASCA 
158).  
This article makes a contribution to cultural criminology, and the visual turn identified by 
Carrabine (2012, 2014, 2016), demanding critical engagement with manufactured spectacles 
of criminal justice. It draws upon the scholarship of Sherwin (2000, 2011), who points to the 
convergence of law and popular culture, their mutual reliance and their common tools and 
aspirations. Specifically, this article examines the live broadcast of the Pistorius trial to draw 
attention to the fragility of South Africa’s aspirations to both open justice and human dignity. 
                                                          
1 He was also found guilty of a separate firearms offence, for which he received a wholly suspended sentence. 
Prosecutors lodged an appeal against both the verdict and the sentence. Whilst awaiting the appeal, and after 
having served only one year in prison, the South African parole authority ruled that Pistorius would spend the 
remainder of his sentence under correctional supervision, or house arrest, in his uncle’s home (BBC News, 
2015). 
As constitutional ideals driving South Africa’s post-apartheid democratisation, both were 
challenged by the decision to broadcast the trial in a moment of old and new media transition, 
compounded by the trial’s entanglement of race, privilege, disability, gendered violence and 
celebrity. The trial won the 2014 Newsmaker of the Year Award (see Section 4, below), and 
this article points to the difficulty of sustaining both open justice and human dignity in criminal 
proceedings in the digital age. Although audio and visual recording of ‘notorious’ criminal 
trials is not new (Sherwin, 2000), the live broadcast of the Pistorius trial raised unique 
considerations. As the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa stated recently: ‘The Pistorius 
trial […] changed irreversibly the manner in which the media and the justice system of our 
country converge’ (The NDPP v Media 24 Limited & others and HC van Breda v Media 24 
Limited & others [2017] ZASCA 97: [41]).  
To date, the Pistorius trial and its broadcast has generated scholarship about new media 
(Knight, 2017; Scott, 2016; Van der Vyver, 2017), old media (Johnson, 2016; Maraise et al., 
2014; Ndlovu, 2016), public trials (James, 2017), journalistic ‘groupthink’ (Phelps and Glenn, 
2016), media portrayals of criminal trials (Johnson, 2016; Maraise et al., 2014; Ndlovu, 2016; 
Obbard and Cork, 2016; Phelps and Glenn 2016; Scott 2016; Van der Vyver, 2017), spectacles 
of gendered violence (Gunne, 2017), and media representations of disability (Bansel and 
Davies, 2014; Harvey, 2015; Ellis and Goggin, 2015; Swartz, 2013). The trial was said to 
represent a ‘godsend’ to the South African mainstream media which had experienced a severe 
contraction, generating jobs and revenue across the media spectrum (Chuma, 2016. See also 
Green, 2014).  
This article draws this media scholarship into the context of law, specifically law’s aspirations 
to open justice and human dignity, and particularly how in the digital age these might be 
achieved through specific media practices. Open justice requires that justice be seen to be done. 
Whilst conceptually this means that judicial practices and proceedings should be open to the 
public, in reality open justice largely serves media corporations, for whom courtroom events 
are valuable commodities. The Pistorius case unfolded in the specific context of South Africa, 
a nation still building its democratic institutions following its history of apartheid.2 The post-
apartheid Constitution provides a framework for achieving social transformation, and open 
justice plays an important role in it. Whilst transparency and accountability – both vital 
                                                          
2  For a detailed examination of open justice in South Africa and internationally, see The NDPP v Media 
24 Limited & others and HC van Breda v Media 24 Limited & others [2017] ZASCA 97.  
principles for open justice – are important attributes of post-apartheid governance, so too are 
human dignity, equality and freedom. All of these values together have constitutional force, 
and the decision to broadcast the Pistorius trial demanded that they somehow survive 
concurrently. Amid concerns about sensationalism and voyeurism, the broadcast of the 
Pistorius trial functioned as a constitutional experiment, testing the role of open justice in 
national transformation. This article shows how these ideals, in the ensuing media spectacles 
generated by the broadcast of the trial, instead of surviving and flourishing, became hopelessly 
tangled.  
South Africa’s history of racial inequality has been deeply embedded within its criminal justice 
system. Further, its criminal justice system has been incapable of addressing its epidemic of 
gendered violence, and South African has the world’s highest rates of rape and spousal 
homicide (Goldblatt 2018; see also Smythe 2015). Given this backdrop, the live broadcast of a 
sensational trial provided an opportunity to shine a light on how criminal justice was really 
administered in contemporary South Africa. With both Pistorius and Steenkamp occupying 
racially privileged positions, with their white Afrikaner heritage, the principles of open justice 
would enable the public to assess the post-apartheid achievement of equality before the law.  
In large part, the decision to broadcast the trial was supported by claims upon the new South 
African Constitution, which came into effect in 1997, and which had the aim of dismantling 
apartheid and achieving democracy through the restoration of dignity. As expressed by Arthur 
Chaskalson (2000: 199) in a lecture shortly before he became Chief Justice of South Africa, 
the Constitution demands that ‘our society be transformed from the closed, repressive, racial 
oligarchy of the past, to an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom’. Dignity, in South Africa, is not only a value but ‘a justiciable and enforceable right 
that must be respected and protected’ (Dawood & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others, 
Shalabi & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others, Thomas & Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs & Others [2000] ZACC 8: [35]; see also Cornell, 2008:18).3 The South African 
jurisprudence of dignity contains repeated resolute statements, demanding that dignity be 
deployed to ‘contradict our past’, ‘to inform the future’, and to demand ‘respect for the intrinsic 
worth of all human beings’ (Dawood & Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others, Shalabi 
                                                          
3 Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of rights and freedoms are expressed in 
section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and reaffirmed in its Bill of Rights: Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss. 1, 7, 10. 
& Another v Minister of Home Affairs & Others, Thomas & Another v Minister of Home Affairs 
& Others, [2000] ZACC 8: [35]) 
In post-apartheid South Africa, human dignity has a unique and inalienable status, although 
there is debate over what it means and how to ensure it is given its fullest expression. The law 
reformer and judge sitting on the first Constitutional Court, Yvonne Mokgoro (1997), identified 
a distinctive South African jurisprudence of dignity connected to indigenous law. She 
explained how ubuntu, a humanistic philosophy of Southern Africa, embraced the values at the 
heart of the Constitution, including ‘human dignity itself, respect, inclusivity, compassion, 
concern for others, honesty and conformity’ (Mokgoro, 1997: 7). Ubuntu appeared as a 
foundational principle in the interim Constitution in 1993, but does not appear in the text of the 
final Constitution. As expressed by the anti-apartheid activist and judge Albie Sachs (2007: 
705), ubuntu means ‘I am a person because you are a person’. Ubuntu requires respect for the 
humanity of all people and, in the context of legal proceedings, aims to achieve the restoration 
of harmony and dignity, and to sensitise a wrong-doer to the hurtful impact of their actions 
(Dikoko v Mokhatla [2006] ZACC 10: [68]). Ubuntu requires case-by-case analysis, and 
attention to social relationships and practices examined in context (Mokgoro, 1997: 4).  Ubuntu 
has also been critiqued as a ‘nationalist ideology’, the glorification of ‘an imagined past’, and 
as essentialising African cultures and communities; it has also been implicated as an expedient 
tool in the ‘colonial project’ (see Chasi and Rodny-Gumede, 2016). 
The digital age, abetted by new media technologies, poses new and rapidly-shifting challenges 
to existing debates about cameras in courtrooms, media portrayals of criminal justice, 
voyeurism, sensationalism and misinformation (Sherwin 2000, 2011; Jewkes 2015; Jewkes and 
Linnemann 2018). In an exploding field of scholarship, this article focuses closely on the 
interplay between the contemporary mediascape and South Africa’s constitutional aspirations, 
through its analysis of the broadcast of the Pistorius trial. In this case, the media was held up 
as a promising conduit for freedom, equality and dignity, although this view had critics from 
the outset. According to the South African columnist Danielle Bowler (2014), 
Reeva Steenkamp's death has been turned into something that has market value. 
The proliferation of books on the trial, from journalists to ex-girlfriend's mothers 
and now Steenkamp's own mother, raises a question about the limits of journalistic 
ethics, the influence of capitalism, our supposed right to see it all, and concern for 
how to give Steenkamp a voice and maintain her dignity. 
The Oscar Pistorius case unfolded in a complex cultural, legal and technological environment, 
entangling constitutional ideals with commercial media imperatives, compounded by the 
seemingly limitless affordances of the digital age. These were further tested by a concatenation 
of intersecting themes: race, gender, disability, privilege, violence, celebrity, sport, fear, guns 
and national identity (see Chari, 2017: 837-840). In this article, the jurisprudence underlying 
the decision to broadcast the trial is examined alongside an analysis of the broadcast itself. 
Focusing on specific events in the trial, the manner in which they were broadcast, and the media 
reportage of them, the article evaluates these events against the constitutional aspirations that 
justified the broadcast in the first place. Section 2 sets out the pre-trial processes, and the careful 
judicial consideration of whether and how to broadcast the trial in order to enhance open justice 
and human dignity. Section 3 analyses the trial itself, and particular events during the trial 
which demanded specific media management in order to preserve open justice and dignity. In 
section 4, the article evaluates the legacy of the trial, its contributions to broader public 
understanding of criminal justice in South Africa, and the lessons learned from the difficulties 
in reconciling open justice and human dignity. 
 
SECTION 2: PRE-TRIAL 
Before the murder trial could begin, the High Court of South Africa in Pretoria was asked to 
rule on whether media agencies could access all of the evidence as it was presented in the 
courtroom, in order to broadcast the trial live across various media platforms. Whilst it was not 
the first time that South African courts were asked to broadcast their proceedings (Afri-Forum 
& Another v Malema & Others [2011] ZAEQC 2; Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd t/a Live Africa 
Network News v King NO and Others 2000(4) SA 973 (C); Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a e-TV 
v Downer and Others [2004] ZAKZHC 15; SA Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Thatcher and 
Others [2005] ZAWCHC 63), this application resulted in a 24-hour news channel, and multiple 
online sites, providing around-the-clock access, coverage and commentary on the trial as it 
unfolded. The decision confirmed Sherwin’s assessment that, in the digital age ‘law is a co-
producer of popular culture’ (2000: 5). 
The media application was adjudicated in Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd v National 
Prosecuting Authority, In Re: S v Pistorius [2014] ZAGPPHC 37, with other applicants 
including Combined Artistic Productions CC, Primedia Broadcasting (a division of Primedia 
(Pty) Ltd), Media 24 Limited, Times Media Group Limited, and Independent News and Media 
Limited. Together, the applicants represented corporations across the media spectrum: radio, 
newspapers, magazines, news production, television production, pay-television, internet 
subscription platforms and digital content publishers. 
The media application was articulated through constitutional arguments asserting the right to 
freedom of expression. The South African Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, 
which includes the freedom of the press and other media, and also the freedom to receive and 
disseminate ideas and information (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s. 16; 
Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority, In Re: S v Pistorius [2014] 
ZAGPPHC 37: [6]). The Constitutional Court has given wide scope to the right to freedom of 
expression, finding that it ‘lies at the heart of a democracy’, and is ‘a guarantor of democracy’ 
(South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (4) SA 469 
(CC): [7]). The freedom is implicit in recognising and protecting ‘the moral agency of 
individuals’ and in facilitating ‘the search for truth’; it enables citizens to ‘hear, form and 
express views freely on a wide range of matters’ (South African National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) [7]). Recent jurisprudence gives rise 
to legitimate concerns, however, that freedom of expression has come to dominate other 
principles, including dignity and privacy, with the effect that commercial media interests will 
inevitably, constitutionally, outstrip matters of humanity, compassion, respect and integrity. As 
a recent South African court stated, ‘the right of the public to be informed is one of the rights 
underpinned by the value of human dignity’ (The NDPP v Media 24 Limited and others and 
HC van Breda v Media 24 Limited and others [2017] ZASCA 97: [16]). The tethering of human 
dignity to commercial media agencies might explain why South African courts now regard the 
demands made by open justice as ‘uncharted constitutional territory’(The NDPP v Media 24 
Limited and others and HC van Breda v Media 24 Limited and others [2017] ZASCA 97: [8]). 
In opposing the media application to broadcast his trial, Oscar Pistorius argued that the live 
broadcasting in any medium would infringe his right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial is 
constitutionally guaranteed, and demands that every accused person be granted the 
‘foundational values of dignity, freedom and equality which are central to a fair trial’ 
(Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority, In Re: S v Pistorius [2014] 
ZAGPPHC 37: [13]). The Constitutional Court has regarded the right to a fair trial as ‘a 
comprehensive right’, demanding ‘substantive fairness’, and requiring ‘justice to be done and 
also to be seen to be done’ (S v Dzukuda and Others; S v Tshilo 2000 (4) SA 1078 (CC): [9], 
[11]). Superior courts in South Africa have, in the past, balanced freedom of expression 
arguments advanced by media agencies against the right to a fair trial (South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Limited v Downer NO and Shaik [2006] ZASCA 90; South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v The National Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] ZACC 
15; SA Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Thatcher and Others [2005] 4 ALL SA 353 (C)).4  
In articulating his right to a fair trial, Pistorius further argued that ‘the mere knowledge of the 
presence of audio visual equipment’ in the courtroom would inhibit him, his witnesses and his 
counsel (Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority, In Re: S v Pistorius 
[2014] ZAGPPHC 37: [12]). He also expressed concerns that, through the broadcasts, 
witnesses who had not yet been called to testify would be able to hear the evidence already 
presented, and ‘fabricate and adapt their evidence’ with this knowledge (14]). 
The judge presiding over the media application was Judge President Dunstan Mlambo. In 
Multichoice, Mlambo made clear from the opening paragraph of his judgment that his decision 
would be guided by foundational constitutional principles: the various rights of the accused 
person, the obligations of the prosecution, the rights of the media, and the principles of open 
justice. He described these as ‘critical constitutional rights that are seemingly on a collision 
course with one another’ (Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority, In 
Re: S v Pistorius [2014] ZAGPPHC 37: [1]).  
Judge President Mlambo’s judgment contained important remarks about the role of the media 
in achieving the objectives of open justice, and particularly the role of the media in a society 
with stark inequalities. He took judicial notice of the way most South Africans felt about the 
criminal justice system; that is, he accepted without evidence the fact that ‘the justice system 
is still perceived as treating the rich and famous with kid gloves whilst being harsh on the poor 
and vulnerable’ ([27]). Judge President Mlambo found merit in the arguments made by the 
media organisations that live broadcasting had the effect of democratising the proceedings, and 
access to information about the trial.  
Whereas the prevailing media access rules permitted journalists to use Twitter from within the 
courtroom, Judge President Mlambo described this as a tool with ‘minority access’, serving 
only a ‘small segment’ of the community ([21]). Instead, he argued, ‘the community at large’ 
                                                          
4 One of these cases resulted in limited coverage of the trial being permitted by media agencies (SA 
Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Thatcher and Others [2005] ZAWCHC 63); in the other, the court refused the 
media application in its entirety (South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited v Downer NO and Shaik 
[2006] ZASCA 90). This decision was upheld on appeal to the Constitutional Court (South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v The National Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] ZACC 15). 
relies upon the work of journalists, which he described as producing ‘summarised versions’ of 
the proceedings ([21]). He went on to describe the profession of court journalism as producing 
‘second hand’ accounts of proceedings, ‘liable to be inaccurate’, and dependent upon the 
‘understanding and views’ of the reporter ([21]). Instead, he preferred that members of the 
public should have a ‘first-hand account’ of proceedings, by which he meant a live broadcast 
of either audio or video or both ([27]). He did so because, ‘in a country like ours where 
democracy is still somewhat young’, the poor majority perceive that that the justice system 
favours the rich ([27]). Since the Pistorius trial would involve ‘a local and international icon’ 
and ‘celebrity’, a live broadcast of the trial would counteract these widespread ‘negative and 
unfounded perceptions about the judicial system’ ([27]). 
Significantly, the objectives of open justice, according to Judge President Mlambo, would be 
best achieved by broadcasting the trial live and un-mediated. That is, he felt that the poor 
majority which held the criminal justice system in disrepute ought to see and hear for 
themselves what was happening within the courtroom, and form their own views about it. 
Second-hand and inaccurate interpositions of journalists and reporters would stand between 
citizens and accurate court information. He wrote:  
it has come to my attention that there are media houses that intend to establish 24 hour 
channels dedicated to the trial only and that panels of legal experts and retired judges 
may be assembled to discuss and analyse proceedings as they unfold. Because of these 
intentions, it behoves me to reiterate that there is only one court that will have the duty 
to analyse and pass judgment in this matter. The so-called trial by media inclinations 
cannot be in the interest of justice as required in this matter and have the potential to 
seriously undermine the court proceedings that will soon start as well as the 
administration of justice in general ([28]).  
Judge President Mlambo ordered that audio and video recording equipment be installed in the 
courtroom; his judgment included annexures that showed small photographs of the approved 
cameras (Annexure A) and diagrams showing where they were to be positioned within the 
courtroom and control room (Annexure B). His judgment included technical specifications 
about the cameras and how they were to be installed (‘unobtrusive’), controlled (‘remotely 
controlled’) and focused (‘no extreme close-ups’; ‘only by way of a ‘wide shot’’) (Orders 2.1–
2.4, 6.3). There would be no ‘movie lights’, no flashes, and they were not to emit any visible 
or audible lights or signals (Order 2.7). The presiding judicial officers and court managers 
could visit the control room to satisfy themselves that the images met the objectives of the 
judgment (Order 2.9). He permitted that the entire trial could be live broadcast in audio only, 
but that live audio-visual broadcasting was limited to specific events during the trial.5 Still 
photography would be permitted during the trial, in a manner ‘as unobtrusive as possible’, with 
cameras controlled by photographers ‘who will at all times remain behind the cameras while 
court is in process’; no extreme close-ups, no flashes, no cabling on the floor, no lens or film 
changes during proceedings, and the equipment and its operators’ clothing were not to bear any 
names, marks, logos or symbols (Order 5). They would be permitted to take still photographs 
during the entire trial, excluding photographs of the accused or his defence witnesses during 
their testimony (Order 5.10). Any other witnesses, except experts testifying for the state, or 
police officers, could object to being photographed whilst testifying, or else they could place 
reasonable conditions upon any photography, including having their face obscured or only 
permitting wide-angle photographs to be taken (Order 5.10–5.12). 
These detailed requirements and prohibitions, whilst necessary and pragmatic, also had the 
effect of turning Judge President Mlambo into a de facto media producer and content manager. 
He attended to the aesthetics, visuality, acoustics and technologies of media production, and to 
the movements and appearance of the personnel who facilitated it. It gave the impression that 
he was implicitly choreographing a complex performance. Sherwin described this as ‘the 
jurisprudence of appearances’, in which the courts of law and the courts of public opinion 
collaborate to produce spectacles of justice (2000, 12). This offers a valuable insight into the 
workings of open justice, where the jurisprudence of transparency achieves its objectives 
through a multidisciplinary collaboration. It sees commercial media agencies, motivated by the 
profits attached to audiences, espousing principles of accountability in supporting their 
applications. At the same time, it demands that judicial officers overlook the reality that their 
                                                          
5  Order 4 reads: MultiChoice and Primedia are permitted to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the 
following portions of the trial only, in live transmissions, delayed broadcasts and/or extracts from the 
proceedings: 
4.1 Opening argument of the state and accused; 
4.2 Any interlocutory applications during the trial; 
4.3 The evidence of all experts called to give evidence for the state, excluding evidence of the accused  
and his witnesses; 
4.4 The evidence of any police officer or former police officer in relation to the crime scene; 
4.5 The evidence of all other witnesses for the state unless such a witness does not consent to such    
       recording and broadcasting and the presiding judge rules that no such recording and broadcasting   
      can take place; 
4.6 Closing argument of the state and the accused; 
4.7 Delivery of the judgment on the merits; and 
4.8 Delivery of the judgment on sentence, if applicable. 
courtroom is a lucrative commodity. The administration of open justice – as happened here – 
is not the same thing as the proper administration of justice, which is a foundational 
requirement of a society founded upon the rule of law. Whilst the media applicants sought to 
fill the courtroom with broadcasting equipment and personnel, it was never actually 
demonstrated that these would facilitate the constitutional aspirations of accountability and 
transformation. Certainly once the trial commenced, Judge President Mlambo’s concerns about 
the danger of a ‘trial by media’ became well-founded. 
Attempting to anticipate these dangers, Judge President Mlambo ruled that if at any time the 
presiding judge determined that the presence of the equipment, or the recording, transmission 
or broadcasting interfered with a witness’s right to privacy or dignity, or to the accused’s right 
to a fair trial, the judge could order that the media agencies cease recording, photographing, 
transmitting or broadcasting (Order 8). 
Setting the tone for a media sensation, Judge President Mlambo’s judgment noted that Pistorius 
and Steenkamp had a ‘romantic relationship’ and that Steenkamp ‘lost her life’ on a date 
‘recognized by many as Valentine’s Day’ ([2]). Again, he demonstrated his realisation that, in 
defending the constitutional principle of open justice, he was also complicit in preparing the 
scene for a televisual tragedy to unfold. He knew that he was delivering to media agencies a 
captive audience, eager to witness the spectacle of the wheels of justice turning in real-time. 
He recalled that, during Pistorius’ bail application, the Magistrates Court experienced a ‘near 
chaotic situation’ when members of the press and the public could not be accommodated within 
the courtroom, and foresaw that ‘scores of journalists’ from around the world would be 
covering the trial ([5]). He noted that the media applicants were relying, in their application, 
upon the status of Pistorius as ‘a local and international icon’ and Steenkamp as ‘similarly 
placed’ ([4]). Summarising the position of the media agencies, he said that the criminal 
proceedings to date had ‘captured the attention and imagination of both the South African and 
international communities’, and so they sought permission to ‘record and inform’ the public 
‘as exhaustively as possible’ ([4]). 
Having identified ‘a clear contestation’ of constitutional rights ([14]), fundamental rights 
‘seemingly on a collision course with one another’ ([1]), Judge President Mlambo explained 
that section 173 of the Constitution demanded that he undertake a balancing exercise to resolve 
the conflict, ensuring that the interests of justice are upheld ([14]–[15]). The interests of justice 
embrace an accused person’s right to a fair trial, but would also encompass the rights and 
obligations of the prosecution, and any other interested party ([17]). The balancing exercise 
inevitably results in the amplification of one right and the attenuation of another. South African 
courts have stated that it is not a matter of one right trumping another, but rather that they be 
reconciled, as ‘all protected rights have equal value’ (Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a e-TV v 
Director of Public Prosecution (Western Cape) [2007] ZASCA 56: [9]). Pistorius argued that 
his right to a fair trial demanded the constriction of both the freedom of expression rights 
asserted by the media agencies, and also of the principle of open justice (Multichoice 
(Proprietary) Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority, In Re: S v Pistorius [2014] ZAGPPHC 37 
[18]). Judge President Mlambo, however, took the view that all of the rights needed to find 
‘proper expression’ and that none of them should be ‘unduly limited’ ([19]). He stated: ‘My 
task is to look at each right at stake and permit its enjoyment to achieve the objective for which 
it is asserted’ ([19]).  
For Judge President Mlambo, the key issue for determination was not whether or how to permit 
specific forms of recording or broadcasting, but how best to facilitate public information and 
education about the functioning of the courts (Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd v National 
Prosecuting Authority, In Re: S v Pistorius [2014] ZAGPPHC 37: [20]). Reasoning in this way, 
Pistorius’ position that no media equipment be permitted in the courtroom would have the 
effect that the majority of the community would not have access to accurate information about 
the trial, as they would be reliant upon the ‘summarised’, ‘second hand’ ‘accounts’ that, for 
centuries, we have accepted as journalism ([21]). Put another way, Pistorius’ objections to the 
media application would ‘surely jettison the noble objectives of the principle of open justice’; 
Judge President Mlambo was unable to countenance ‘a stance that seeks to entrench the 
workings of the justice system away from the public domain’ ([22]).  
The Constitutional Court had earlier ruled that the role of the Constitution was to ‘establish a 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom and institutions of government which 
are open, transparent and accountable to the people whom they serve’ (Geldenhuys v Minister 
of Safety and Security and Another [2002] ZAWCHC 2: [45]). The Court had said that the 
publicity and openness of the courts provided not only knowledge and information about 
proceedings, but ensured that ‘the people can discuss, endorse, criticize, applaud or castigate 
the conduct of their courts’ (S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC): [29]). Whilst Judge 
President Mlambo no doubt had in mind sober civic discourse, he was also describing practices 
that could give rise to an atmosphere of sensationalism and voyeurism. Acknowledging that 
Oscar Pistorius himself, and also his witnesses, would be impacted by giving evidence in the 
knowledge that they were being recorded or photographed, Judge President Mlambo ordered 
that their testimony not be recorded or broadcast in any visual medium, but that their testimony 
be audio recorded and broadcast on radio (Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd v National 
Prosecuting Authority, In Re: S v Pistorius [2014] ZAGPPHC 37: [25]–[26]).  
 
SECTION 3: THE TRIAL 
Following his plea of not guilty to murder, and not guilty to unrelated firearms offences, the 
trial of Oscar Pistorius commenced on 3 March 2014. As juries have been abolished in South 
Africa (Abolition of Juries Act 34 of 1969 (South Africa)), the presiding judge was Justice 
Thokozile Masipa, and she was assisted by two lay assessors. 
A considerable amount of time during the trial was taken up with the management of media 
matters. This was done with considerable care, patience and sensitivity, and there were a 
number of instances where Justice Masipa was required to clarify or modify her orders. These 
issues were themselves live broadcast, and whilst they were neither telegenic nor compelling, 
they demonstrated the seriousness with which the court took the demands of open justice. 
The court heard 49 days of evidence in the trial. The court gallery always appeared crowded, 
and there was another crowded ‘overflow’ court nearby, filled with international journalists. 
The live broadcast included long periods in which nothing happened, or where the media pack 
was seen to be amusing themselves to pass the time. Where broadcasting was not permitted, 
viewers watched a still photograph of Oscar Pistorius on their screen. Some of the testimony 
was delivered in Afrikaans through a court interpreter. Pistorius’ neighbours testified that they 
heard screams or an argument during the night of the shooting, with some discrepancy about 
whether it was a woman or a man screaming. Under cross-examination, they held fast to their 
evidence that the screaming occurred before the shooting. There was also evidence from the 
security guard and estate manager who responded to the shooting. Expert evidence was called 
by both prosecution and defence, from fields including ballistics, pathology, anaesthesiology, 
police forensics, acoustic engineering, forensic psychiatry, social work and sports medicine. 
The court also heard from the surgeon who had amputated Pistorius’ limbs when he was 11 
months old. Pistorius himself gave evidence and was subjected to cross-examination for five 
days. The court heard testimony from one of Pistorius’ ex-girlfriends and his agent. The court 
was shown multiple text messages sent between Pistorius and Steenkamp via their iPhones and 
using WhatsApp messaging. The bathroom door through which Steenkamp had been shot, and 
which Pistorius broke down with a cricket bat, was brought into the courtroom, as was the 
cricket bat; a forensics expert conducted an in-court demonstration with the bat. The South 
African Test cricketer, Herschelle Gibbs, viewing the trial on television, tweeted: ‘Just saw my 
signature on the bat used by the accused in oscar trial… lol #neveradullmoment’ (Rice, 2014). 
Unsurprisingly, some of the most compelling and memorable evidence presented at the trial 
was visual evidence, including photographs and video footage. Both the prosecution and 
defence tendered evidence of this kind, and it was displayed on monitors in the courtroom. The 
monitors were visible to the witness box, prosecution and defence, the judge and assessors, as 
well as the gallery. The broadcast of the trial displayed the monitors, except when the judge 
prohibited such broadcasting. In addition to videos and images, the monitors were used to 
display the SMS (text) messages and WhatsApp messaging which was tendered into evidence. 
Through these visual technologies, Sherwin’s ‘visual sublime’ was evident, acknowledging 
that visual spectacles contain an ‘excess of meaning’, sometimes concealing a ‘formidable 
terror’, and that this ‘dazzling baroque labyrinth’ poses both a challenge and a thrill for creators 
and consumers of visualised law (2011, 3-5).  
When police investigators first arrived at the Pistorius home after the shooting, photographs 
were taken of both Steenkamp’s body and of Pistorius himself. Steenkamp had been shot in the 
right thigh, the shoulder, and in the head. The fourth shot fired did not hit her. Those 
photographs were graphic and had very high impact, and Masipa J and both parties were 
vigilant about, and sensitive to, the effects of these images. According to David Smith, a 
journalist at The Guardian, June Steenkamp’s lawyer, Dup de Bruyn, had an agreement with 
the lead prosecutor Gerrie Nel that Nel would notify the Steenkamp family in advance of 
displaying any graphic images; Reeva’s mother, June, used this notification in order to avoid 
viewing those images during the trial (BBC 3 2014; Smith, 2014a).  
Early on Day 6, Masipa J clarified her earlier order prohibiting the print media from 
broadcasting images and publishing photographs of some witnesses for the duration of the trial 
because the Court has ‘the duty to respect the dignity and privacy of witnesses who have taken 
the trouble to come and give their evidence’ (Hess, 2014: [9:39]; Livestream, 2014: [4:10]–
[4:24]).  The print media had complained that they were normally entitled to publish images of 
any witness after they have been excused, and Masipa J disagreed. She explained that this was 
not a ‘normal’ situation, and that a ‘cautious’ approach was demanded. She said that all 
witnesses were vulnerable to having public perceptions of them altered by their having given 
evidence, and this was compounded for witnesses who were otherwise private people. She had 
been informed that two witnesses had been humiliated and attacked on social media after 
testifying, and she was motivated to protect their ‘private family life’ as well as their dignity 
and privacy. She also said that the state had a duty to protect state witnesses, and that duty 
continued until the conclusion of the trial.  
Her ruling was that witnesses who were public figures could have their images published after 
they finished providing evidence at the trial, but images of witnesses who were not public 
figures, and who objected to their image being broadcast or published, could not be published 
for the duration of the trial. This ruling did not apply to audio broadcasting of their testimony, 
and there were no constraints upon journalists live tweeting their testimony. It also didn’t apply 
to broadcasting images of the public gallery. This decision was intended to conform with 
constitutional jurisprudence in which privacy and dignity are bound together, and that only 
famous people, in limited contexts, might have fewer privacy protections (NM & Others v 
Smith & Others 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC): 88). It had the effect of conflating privacy with dignity, 
as if it were somehow more dignified to hear – but not to see – a witness testifying, or as if 
privacy vested in one’s image but not one’s voice or speech. It also had the effect of placing 
into stark contrast the live broadcast of images and audio of Pistorius himself, and his visceral 
reactions to some of the evidence, and whether his dignity could have survived these events, 
which is discussed below. The Constitutional Court, in an earlier ruling on privacy, dignity and 
psychological integrity, recognised that its judgment involved ‘a nuanced and sensitive 
approach to balancing the interests of the media, in advocating freedom of expression, privacy 
and dignity’, regardless of whether constitutional or common law principles were applied (NM 
& Others v Smith & Others 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC): 31). In making the order in the Pistorius 
trial, Masipa J appeared to be holding the same principles in balance, and she ordered that the 
media agencies appoint an attorney to be present in court every day ‘to ensure that the cameras 
stick to the rules and to act as a point of contact person for complaints from either the state or 
the defence teams’ (Livestream, 2014: [8:30]–[8:47]). 
The state prosecutor then made a special application to the Court to further restrict the broadcast 
of the testimony of state pathologist, Professor Gert Saayman, who had taken photographs of 
Steenkamp’s injuries whilst conducting an autopsy (Harding 2014; Smith et al., 2014; Youtube, 
2014: [14:20]). The application was to prevent his testimony from being broadcast entirely, 
banning both audio and video, and also preventing any publication of the exhibits – 
photographs – that he would show during his testimony. The application was framed in terms 
of ‘the respect and dignity of […] the deceased’ and the ‘rights’ of Steenkamp’s family and 
friends, and an instance where press freedom, or freedom of communication, should be 
restricted. Whilst the court was not required to rule on the issue, there is no extant South African 
jurisprudence which recognises a right to dignity after death.6  
The court waited for the media counsel, Nick Ferreira, to make his way through traffic to attend; 
when he arrived he made submissions about the ‘groundbreaking case’ before the court, and 
the ‘highly unusual trial’ that was unfolding (YouTube, 2014: [23:00]). Ferreira agreed that the 
dignity of the deceased and her family were a priority and suggested that the live broadcast be 
stopped for the duration of the pathologist’s evidence. He proposed a compromise position, 
which was that the media provide a summarised version, or package, of Saayman’s evidence 
to the parties and the court for approval and subsequent broadcast (YouTube, 2014: [22:15]–
[27:32]). Ferreira argued that his approach addressed ‘the issues of sensitivity that the witness 
has raised’ and ‘accommodates all of the concerns which have been raised by the witness, it 
accommodates any possibility of infringement of dignity of the deceased or of any kind of trial-
related prejudice that may occur as a result of the broadcast’ (YouTube, 2014: [25:14]–
[26:21]). He continued: 
And moreover [the media’s proposed approach] has the advantage of being the far 
less restrictive approach insofar as the media’s right to freedom of expression is 
concerned and insofar as the principle of open justice is concerned because it’s an 
approach which says ‘we do not ban in advance everything that this witness might 
say because we don’t know what he might say.’ It might be that some of his evidence 
is perfectly benign, doesn’t raise any concern at all.  If so, there’s no good reason 
to limit the rights of freedom of expression or the principle of open justice insofar 
as that evidence is concerned. But it appropriately strikes the balance between the 
sensitivities which have been raised by the witness, and those important principles 
of freedom of expression and the principle of open justice (YouTube, 2014: 
[26:21]–[27:32]). 
                                                          
6 There is recognition that the right to life incorporates the right to dignity, and consideration given to the quality 
of one’s life (Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters and Another 2002 (2) SACR 105 (CC): 
[5]; S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391: [326]–[327]). There is further recognition that ‘people who 
lack the capacity to cultivate the subjective aspects of dignity can nevertheless be said to have a type of dignity 
which demands respect’(Feldman, 1999, 2000, 2002: 127).  
Ferreira requested that the media retain access to the testimony, that live tweeting be permitted, 
and that the media broadcast an approved summary following the testimony. Defence counsel, 
Kenny Oldwage, was concerned about these delays and interruptions to his client’s trial, and 
also made the point that the media’s proposal that the parties collaborate on preparing a media 
package went far beyond their roles in the administration of justice. The prosecutor, Gerry Nel, 
in an effort to expedite the proceedings and, in his words, ‘just to get the show on the road, 
m’lady’, proposed a mutually-agreed live broadcast blackout (YouTube, 2014: [38:00]). The 
court made the order banning all live broadcasting in any medium, including live tweeting 
(YouTube, 2014: [50:47]). Masipa J said that Professor Saayman’s testimony would be of an 
‘explicitly graphic nature’ and should not be shown world-wide. The trial continued with 
journalists and the public remaining in the galleries. 
However, the prosecutor then sought leave for Professor Saayman to address the court further 
about the ethical issues that would arise from the graphic and detailed nature of his evidence, 
given his professional duty not to do harm, and this was granted. Professor Saayman asked that 
his evidence not be broadcast because ‘the very graphic details pertaining to some of the 
injuries and wounds which may be described have the potential to compromise the dignity of 
the deceased’; he further invoked ‘the good morals of society’ (Smith et al., 2014. See also 
Harding 2014).  
During Saayman’s testimony, some images were blocked from being displayed to the 
courtroom gallery or on certain monitors within the courtroom (Smith 2014b; Smith 2014c). 
Instead, images of the deceased were circulated around the courtroom rather than displayed on 
the courtroom monitors. Steenkamp’s parents were forewarned about the ‘gruesome’ images 
that would be shown (BBC 3, 2014). During the lunch recess, Lulama Luti, a spokesperson for 
the Ministry of Justice, clarified the judge’s order: summaries and paraphrasing were allowed 
after the testimony, but direct quotations and live reporting (including tweeting and blogging) 
were not permitted (Hess, 2014).  
The constraints placed upon the reporting led to the outcome that a proportion of the reporting 
related to the constraints themselves. Following Sherwin’s analysis of the ‘gratification-based 
logic’ that supports the public dissemination of legal processes, but also the ‘anxieties’, open 
justice and its limitations became a substantial topic in the reportage of the trial, which had 
been characterised by ongoing ‘meta-reporting’, in analysis conducted by Wallace Chuma 
(2016: 330; see Sherwin 2010: 12; Sherwin 2011: 3). For example, during Saayman’s 
testimony, when journalists were prevented from reporting live about his evidence, the News24 
channel devoted to trial coverage included the following reports in its live news feed:  
9:36 – And we've started. Judge Masipa is granting an order...  
9:37 – Order regards witness images being used by media. 
9:39 – Court has duty to respect witnesses' dignity and privacy, says judge 
Masipa.  
9:40 – Judge says character of two witnesses attacked in social media after taking 
stand. 
9:41 – Duty to protect witnesses until end of trial, says judge.  
9:41 – Print media prohibited from publishing photos of witnesses irrespective of 
source.  
9:43 – Judge Masipa grants court order allowing print media to publish photos 
of witnesses who are public figures once they have finished evidence.  
9:44 – Judge also orders that no picture of objecting witnesses (who are not 
public figures) can be published for duration of trial.  
9:44 – Roux (BR) starts cross-examining Pieter Baba (PB). […] 
12:04 – No live broadcast of evidence. Applies to twitter too, says judge.   
12:13 – The UK Telegraph's Aislinn Laing has tweeted: ‘In the absence of clarity 
from the judge, we'll try to update you on the Telegraph live blog but will be 
summarised.’ Personally, I think this might not be best. Agree? 
12:14 – Saayman has started giving his evidence but we can't tell you what it is 
because of the order.   
12:32 – David Smith has quoted Judge Masipa as saying: When I referred to 
Twitter, I failed to refer to blogging as well. Twitter is not allowed, blogging is 
not allowed. 
12:34 – To clarify: We can tell you, for instance, what OP's doing in court right 
now. We can't tell you what Saayman is saying while testifying though. Not now. 
13:28 – Ministry of Justice says Saayman's testimony can be summarised but no 
direct quotes, tweets Debora Patta (Hess, 2014).   
Following Saayman’s testimony, journalists in the courtroom reported that Oscar Pistorius had 
vomited, gagged and retched repeatedly whilst hearing the evidence (Smith, 2014b). Whilst the 
gallery could not see the images shown by Saayman during his testimony, these would have 
been visible to Pistorius. The testimony and the images detailed the bullet wounds to 
Steenkamp’s body, including the exit wounds and other marks and discolouration of her skin, 
which he testified was consistent with the impact of a bullet fired through a door (Smith, 2014b, 
2014c). It included testimony that said the expanding bullets used by Pistorius had caused 
maximum tissue damage to Steenkamp’s head, leaving fragments in her skull. The bullets were 
designed to ‘open up, flatten out and mushroom when striking human tissue’; ‘the usual result 
is it folds out like the petals of a flower. They were specifically designed by the manufacturers 
to have very sharp jagged edges. This projectile was designed to cause maximum damage. It 
has a black metal jacket’ (Smith, 2014b).  
Pistorius was described as ‘hunched over’ and with ‘hands on his ears as if trying to block out 
the words’, ‘weeping and clasping his hands behind his neck’ whilst he heard the testimony, 
and that Masipa J briefly adjourned proceedings twice to ask defence counsel Barry Roux to 
attend to his client (Smith, 2014c). She also asked whether Pistorius was able to hear and 
understand the proceedings. Pistorius’ sister, Aimee, went to sit with him in the dock and 
embraced him, but he was described as ‘inconsolable’ and ‘curling into a ball’ (Smith, 2014b). 
When Professor Saayman described a photo which showed the ‘smearing and scattering of 
tissue including bony elements’, Pistorius rocked back and forth and retched (Smith, 2014b). 
Masipa J asked Roux if he could assist his client, to which Roux replied, ‘My lady, he's not 
fine but he's not going to be fine. He's having some difficulty. He's very emotional but it's not 
going to change’ (Smith, 2014b). The dock microphone was moved away from him and a metal 
bin was placed at his feet (Smith, 2014c). He vomited into it several times.  
One journalist reported that, whilst Pistorius had ‘mostly retained his self-possession’ during 
the testimony of neighbours and his ex-girlfriend, it was the ‘cold, clinical, scientific’ language 
used by Professor Saayman that ‘finally robbed [him] of his composure’ (Smith, 2014b). In 
one respect, Pistorius’ emotional performance enacted what Mokgoro J, above, had identified 
as a component of ubuntu; that is, the ‘sensitising’ of the wrong-doer to the harmful effects of 
their wrong-doing (Dikoko v Mokhatla [2006] ZACC 10: 32). Meanwhile, Steenkamp’s family 
and friends were described as weeping during the testimony. Carl Pistorius, the defendant’s 
brother, left the courtroom. The judge’s registrar was described as having her hand over her 
mouth as she heard the testimony; other court personnel were described as looking nauseous 
(Hess, 2014). In witnessing the evidence, these people were enacting the ubuntu qualities of 
‘[g]roup solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, humanistic orientation 
and collective unity’ (Mokgoro, 1997: 4).  
The issue of Steenkamp’s dignity was examined by reporters and commentators observing the 
trial. Some criticised the ruling on the grounds that the dignity of other deceased crime victims 
had not been so carefully guarded by the courts (Hlongwane 2014; Patta 2014). In particular, 
one contrast was drawn between the dignity of Steenkamp and that of 34 miners shot by police 
in Marikana in 2012, and whose injuries and deaths had been graphically broadcast and 
reported upon following extensive media access to the court. Another contrast was drawn 
between the dignity of Steenkamp and that of Anene Booysen, a young black woman who in 
2013 was gang-raped until she died of her injuries. Again, extensive and high-impact reporting 
of the evidence of her injuries was permitted, as her death had triggered widespread public 
protest and condemnation and also a statement from the United Nations (United Nations in 
South Africa, 2013). The South African journalist, Debora Patta (2014), comparing the cases, 
wrote of Booysen: ‘Her injuries were horrific – but no detail was spared, including the very 
graphic testimony from a paramedic who found her with her intestines hanging out. The dignity 
of Booysen and her family was not ever raised in court’.7 Jacqueline Rose (2005: 3), in her 
London Review of Books essay about the Pistorius trial, noted that, following Booysen’s death, 
Reeva Steenkamp had retweeted a report of her funeral and, on Instagram, had posted an image 
of a man’s hand silencing a woman’s scream with the text: ‘I woke up in a happy safe home 
this morning. Not everyone did. Speak out against the rape of individuals’. At the time of her 
death, Steenkamp was preparing to give a speech in a Johannesburg school in honour of 
Booysen and to draw attention to rape and sexual violence. For Rose, this was evidence of a 
cross-racial affinity that Steenkamp felt with Booysen, given their shared experience as women 
living in a society that was dangerous for women. For Patta, it warranted no distinction in the 
manner in which the evidence of their injuries was reported. She argued that open justice 
demanded that the public had access to the evidence, and that whilst a temporary ban on live 
                                                          
7  For more analysis of the distinction between the media coverage of Steenkamp and Booysen, see Melanie 
Verwoerd and Claudia Lopes (eds) 2015, Sexualized Violence in the National Debate: Cross-border 
observations on India and South Africa, Heinrich Böll Foundation Southern Africa. 
broadcasting might be justified in the Pistorius case, there was no rationale for banning 
reporting of the verbatim testimony of Professor Saayman. She wrote, ‘But the public has a 
right to hear these details – undiluted and as harsh as they are. South Africa’s justice system 
cannot be seen to serve rich and poor, black and white in different ways’ (Patta, 2014). 
 
PART 4: CONCLUSION 
Eight months after the delivery of the trial verdict, the National Press Club of South Africa 
announced that its 2014 Newsmaker of the Year Award was to be given to the Oscar Pistorius 
Trial. By contrast, the previous year’s winner was Nelson Mandela, awarded posthumously. 
The 2014 award reflected the ‘news value’ and ‘media attention’ garnered by the trial, and the 
fact that it ‘dominated the news in 2014’ (National Press Club, 2015). A media release 
explained that the award for the trial included the ‘roles played’ by Oscar Pistorius himself, 
Judge Thokozile Masipa, the prosecutor Gerrie Nel and the defence counsel Barry Roux. The 
award appeared to confirm the fragility of open justice as a constitutional aspiration, when 
commercial media interests are so clearly its primary stakeholders and beneficiaries. The award 
confirmed Sherwin’s position that visual spectacles of justice are, on the one hand, ‘authentic’, 
‘grounding’, sublimely transformative’, but on the other hand, ‘deadening, reductive, flat and 
sensationally hollow’ (2011, 10). 
Acknowledging the tragedy and loss at the heart of the trial, the Chairperson of the National 
Press Club, Jos Charle, said ‘The National Press Club expresses its heart-felt sympathy to all 
the role-players that suffered from the actions that gave rise to this trial – especially the 
Steenkamp family’ (National Press Club, 2015). In his statement justifying the award, Charle 
made it clear that media value could be calculated for specific trial events:  
Media-wise the trial was bigger than the FIFA 2014 World Cup. Judge Thokozile 
Masipa's banning of blogging and tweeting of graphic evidence by pathologist Gert 
Saayman prompted 2 500 articles. In 24 hours news and social media hit over 106 000 
unique inserts. Pistorius having retched in court was carried in 2 300 news articles. In 
nine days the press hit the 750 000 article mark (National Press Club, 2015). 
In support of the award, Johannes Froneman, a professor of journalism, stated, ‘the shroud of 
secrecy has been ripped off court proceedings’ (National Press Club, 2015). He continued, ‘this 
trial has finally drawn the line on the old mass media dispensation’, and the announcement 
detailed the new formats and opportunities presented by the digital age and media convergence 
(National Press Club, 2015). Despite all of the pre-trial jurisprudential hand-wringing about 
achieving transparency and dignity in a nation still building its institutions of democracy, the 
trial broadcast was here being celebrated for having salvaged a media industry in decline. 
Making clear the entanglements between the judicial system and the media, the address at the 
the award ceremony was delivered by the then-Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa Dikgang 
Moseneke. Moseneke was a lifelong friend of Mandela, whom he met as a fellow prisoner on 
Robben Island; he was executor of Mandela’s estate, and he is a scholarly judicial thinker and 
an outspoken proponent of the proper administration of justice. In the audience at the award 
ceremony was Justice Thokozile Masipa, whom he acknowledged. In his speech, Moseneke 
recognised that the Pistorius trial ‘changed irreversibly’ the nature of the interaction between 
the justice system and the media, and ‘ushered in a new era’ in that relationship (Moseneke, 
2015: 29). He conceded that with ‘the rapid advancement in technology’, the expectation that 
citizens ‘must, or should have to, wander into courtrooms to find out what is happening’ was 
no longer valid (30). The sources of open justice in South Africa are both constitutional and 
traditional, he explained. The preamble of the Constitution describes a democracy founded 
upon accountability, responsiveness and openness (30). However, traditional African culture 
saw disputes resolved under the shade of a tree, witnessed by all, and enabling everyone to 
participate, in a process known as lekgotla. Moseneke pointed out that the architectural 
symbolism of the Constitutional Court building is justice under a tree (30). He said that open 
justice is vital in post-apartheid South Africa, because ‘trust in government institutions in this 
country is hard-earned’, demanding that ‘we […] subject ourselves to the greatest of scrutiny’ 
(30). It wasn’t clear that the scrutiny offered by the trial broadcast, nor the trial’s outcome, 
achieved the goal of building public trust in the administration of justice. 
South Africa’s transformational constitutionalism has been infused with references to dignity. 
Moseneke’s comments in his speech suggest that incremental technological affordances – 
smartphones, laptops, live streaming, live text-based platforms – could also have 
transformational effects, achieving open justice in a dignified manner appropriate to the digital 
age (Moseneke, 2015: 33). Apparently illustrating this point, he sent a tweet during his speech 
(see Moseneke, 2015, footnote 2).  
However, as many observers of the Pistorius trial later noted, despite its aspirations to 
democratise access to criminal proceedings, extreme open justice did not restore dignity to a 
much-maligned criminal justice system. Judge President Mlambo, in making his unprecedented 
order to open criminal proceedings to the nation, was clear in stating that his aim was to correct 
the perception that South Africa’s rich and famous were treated with ‘kid gloves’ (Multichoice 
(Proprietary) Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority, In Re: S v Pistorius [2014] ZAGPPHC 37: 
[27]). The verdict and the sentence, in many quarters, and despite Masipa J’s carefully reasoned 
judgments, undermined those transformational objectives. 
This was starkly illustrated by the South African journalist, Sisonke Msimang (2014), who 
observed the Pistorius trial. She noted that, in the courtroom next door, another trial was 
unfolding, in which a black man, Thato Kutumela, was on trial for the rape and murder of his 
18 year old girlfriend, Zanele Khumalo, also a model, who was five months pregnant. Msimang 
made the point that, whereas police acted upon Steenkamp’s murder immediately and laid 
charged swifly, Kutumela was not charged for nine months, and Khumalo’s family waited two 
years for the trial to commence; that too was thought to be above the usual standard, and 
journalists explained this was due to Khumalo’s beauty and her middle-class status. There was 
considerable international media coverage given to the stark distinction between the two 
concurrent trials. Msimang argued that race continues to matter to the way that violence is 
experienced, perpetrated and addressed in South Africa. Sandile Memela, from South Africa’s 
Department of Arts and Culture, attributed the distinction to ‘structural racism’; he stated: ‘I 
don’t think this country is living up to its ideals of justice and equality for all. Everyone has a 
right to be respected and treated with dignity’ (Peck, 2014). 
Whilst the objectives of the constitution were always squarely in the mind of those who made 
careful and considered decisions to open the courtroom to the media, the spectacle of open 
justice often made it difficult to determine whether human dignity had survived in a voyeuristic 
and exploitative mediascape. It was Reeva Steenkamp’s dignity which was most invoked, and 
gave rise to questions about whether her dignity – constitutionally speaking – survived her 
death, and whether her surviving family and friends might continue to guard her dignity in the 
afterlife. Of course, Pistorius himself, as a criminal defendant, had constitutional protections 
which also operated to preserve his dignity and human rights.8 He was paraded before the 
cameras at the beginning and end of each day of the hearing, often appearing frightened and 
exhausted. Images of him crying, rocking, crumpled in his seat, holding his head, retching and 
                                                          
8 His dignity, constitutionally speaking, was protected following his criminal conviction and his imprisonment: 
S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391: [142]; S v Walters 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC). 
with strings of mucous coming out of his nose cannot be reconciled with his constitutional 
rights to dignity, equality and freedom.  
Another important consideration, in the South African context, was the dignity of all South 
Africans, potential trial observers, all of whom would live with the legacy of the trial and its 
reflection of criminal justice in the post-apartheid state. How could the trial be conducted so as 
to dignify the nation? Whilst it is true that the criminal courts generate intense emotions, and 
whilst open justice ought to provide an accurate account of the administration of justice, the 
global media celebration of the trial’s most traumatic and undignified moments was not 
consistent with the aspirations of the Constitution.  
Technologies of media production remain mostly at odds with the techniques of the criminal 
trial, which is characterised by lengthy oral submissions, motionless personnel, disjointed 
narratives, delays, and arcane, awkward legal terminology.9 Traditionally, open justice has 
relied upon the expectation that the citizen makes the effort to attend court, observe its rituals, 
and follow its processes. For those who make that effort, the brief moments of visceral, 
traumatic or true emotion are all the more poignant for the extended formality and prolixity 
that surrounds them. In traditional open justice regimes, dignity is maintained by only sharing 
intimate, humiliating or personal facts with those citizens who did make the effort to attend. 
By live broadcasting the trial, and offering these sensitive details to an infinite global audience 
of strangers, there is no expectation of sustained attention, and no demand that the viewer sees 
a courtroom incident in the time-consuming context of all of the evidence. Viewers can switch 
the trial on and off, tune in for highlights, avoid complexity and rely upon sensational 
commentary. The decision to live broadcast the trial did nothing to address the court’s concerns 
about poor media practices, and it remains difficult to see why improving sloppy journalism 
should be a responsibility of the criminal justice system. 
For many observers, broadcasting the trial had the effect of putting South Africa itself on trial. 
However, others worried that the trial had exactly the opposite effect, by failing to provide any 
account of what really happens in South Africa’s criminal justice system. Pippa Green (2014) 
                                                          
9 Pistorius’ defence counsel, Barry Roux, caused a viral internet sensation when he repeatedly used the phrase ‘I 
put it to you’ in his cross-examination of witnesses. It was ridiculed in a rap song on YouTube (‘I put it to you, 
that it’s true / everything you say, I will misconstrue / I’m Barry Roux and I put it to you / ten times in a row 
just to confuse you’), as well as on Twitter and in multiple online memes: see YouTube (2014) Barry Roux 
Parody Rap Song. 14 March, 2014. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IlWOjuOx0sQ (accessed 
29 August 2017); Wall Street Journal (2014) ‘I put it to you, My Lady’ from Oscar #Pistorius trial becomes 
South African catchphrase. Twitter, 19 March, 14. Available at: 
https://twitter.com/wsj/status/446246258152595456 (accessed 29 August 2017). 
made the observation that the ‘metanarratives’ to emerge from the trial coverage were the larger 
themes of gender violence, disability, crime and guns. Meanwhile, Wallace Chuma (2016: 323) 
was concerned that the disproportionate media attention to the Pistorius trial had the effect of 
distorting any sense of context, in which the real crises preventing South Africa from achieving 
democracy were entirely effaced. He wrote of the unacknowledged ‘backdrop of increasing 
social inequalities, poverty and crime, all of which raise fundamental questions about the 
material content of democracy two decades after the formal end of legislated racial segregation’ 
(Chuma, 2016: 330). Broadcasting the Pistorius trial did nothing to address public perceptions 
about injustice in South Africa, and in some quarters only served to consolidate them.  
The decision to broadcast the Oscar Pistorius trial brought cameras and media professionals 
into the courtroom, with the explicit intention of showcasing the newly-robust institutions of 
South African criminal justice. That decision also had the effect of showing to international 
media outlets more peripheral but significant facets of the courts: the ‘dusty, shabby, rundown’ 
courthouse, ‘not many windows’, ‘unclean, bare brick corridors’, ‘no seats on the toilets and 
the cubicles do not lock’ (Peck, 2014). In ruling to open the courtroom to the world, Judge 
President Mlambo acknowledged that he was dealing with constitutional rights on a ‘collision 
course’ with each other (Multichoice (Proprietary) Ltd v National Prosecuting Authority, In 
Re: S v Pistorius [2014] ZAGPPHC 37: [1]). His ruling asserted that dignity and open justice 
are compatible principles. Transparency and openness, however, also have the important effect 
of revealing uncomfortable truths about inequality and indignity, and it is these facts that 
continue to beset South Africa under transition. 
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